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MILITARY USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 





Members of the co-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS) took control of 
Qayyara and the surrounding oil fields in June 2014. They were expelled by Iraqi 
forces in August 2016, but as they withdrew north, they created a complex battlespace 
igniting fires at the Al-Mishraq sulphur plant and at oil wells, as well as allegedly 
using chemical weapons. The fires were originally intended to deter coalition 
airstrikes, but later became a ground tactic to thwart the advance of US-backed Iraqi 
government and Peshmerga forces. Oil wells in the Qayyara and Najma oil fields were 
intentionally set alight and it took on average 30 days to put out a single well. Plumes 
from oil fires were observed in satellite images over 267 days, and it is estimated 
that 1,33 million barrels of oil burned. The market value of the sour crude burned 
was between $26,7 million and $45 million. Additionally, the fires denied IS earning 
between $105 000 and $472 000 from road tankerage of oil to Syria. The sulphur piles 
ignited by IS at the Al-Mishraq sulphur plant generated plumes of sulphur dioxide 
(SO2) and hydrogen sulphide (H2S). Using ozone monitoring data, it is estimated that 
83 461 metric tonnes (MT) of SO2 were released into the atmosphere over six days. 
The market value of the combusted sulphur is estimated at $6,1 million. The fires set 
at oil wells and sulphur piles by IS caused significant lost revenue to the ‘caliphate’ 
but also amplified an existing humanitarian crisis in an environmentally degraded 
region. This was caused by a toxic legacy from previous conflicts, coupled with 
desertification and unsustainable agricultural practices. The fires and areas affected 
continued to have real health effects on civilians even after IS had been defeated. For 
humanitarian aid and military personnel who were exposed by being in the areas, the 
severity of the effect was dependent upon the level of toxicity and length of exposure. 
This highlights the need to monitor environmental degradation in conjunction with 
accurate and timely health and environmental threat assessment in conflict areas. 
These must continue after the fighting ends if the true effects are to be understood.
Key words: Islamic State, Qayyara, oil wells, oil fires, sulphur fires, environmental 
degradation.
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Introduction
In June 2014, the subdistrict of Qayyara (also known as Qayarah and Qayara 
35°48′00″N 43°17′00″E) fell to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS) as it advanced 
to seize Mosul and Tikrit. In the wake of the IS advance into Mosul, two divisions of 
Iraqi soldiers (30 000 men) gave up their positions, weapons and bases. To consolidate 
control over the region, IS cut off water to surrounding villages and from Mosul’s 
water purification plant.2 On 7 August 2014, IS captured the Mosul Dam, giving them 
control over a large area of territory and prompting US action to address the threat. 
IS started a tactic of setting fire to oil wells to deter air strikes but on 17–18 August, 
Iraqi and Kurdish Peshmerga forces recaptured the dam with US air support. Military 
operations to take back the city of Qayyara from IS began on 23 August 2016, with 
air support from the Iraqi air force and the US-led coalition. It was at this time that 
IS increased the military use and scale of environmental degradation. Oil fires were 
started at wells in the Qayyara and Najma fields and oil was intentionally spilled onto 
the ground. The Qayyara air base was recaptured in July and Iraqi forces then retook 
the city on 24 August 2016. Shuttle diplomacy in August 2016, by a US envoy to the 
anti-IS coalition, brokered an oil revenue-sharing deal between Iraq and its Kurdish 
region vital to getting Peshmerga forces to advance on Mosul.3 In October, Iraqi forces 
advanced to the Al-Mishraq sulphur plant while Peshmerga forces, on the other side of 
the Tigris, advanced west towards Mosul.4 As US-backed Iraqi and Peshmerga forces 
advanced towards Mosul, IS created a complex battlespace with fires at Al-Mishraq 
sulphur plant combined with oil fires and the alleged use of chemical weapons. On 
27 October 2016, UN Environment chief Erik Solheim called this crime “ecocide”, 
and compared it to the environmental destruction caused by Saddam Hussein’s wars.5
The history of the Qayyara oil field and Al-Mishraq sulphur plant
The Qayyara oil field was explored by the British Oil Development Company 
in 1927, and production commenced during the 1930s. The extracted oil is very 
heavy sour crude (American Petroleum Institute °API = Degrees API Gravity 15° C). 
The nearby Najma oil field is in the same geological structure as Qayyara. It was 
discovered by the British Petroleum Development Company in 1932, but because of 
its sour heavy oil (15 to 20 API gravity) production did not occur. The Najma field is 
11 km (6,8 miles) long and 4,5 km (2,8 miles) wide. Extraction requires electricity 
and water as well as chemicals. Under the UN sanctions regime in the 1990s, oil 
industry maintenance standards fell due to a lack of spare parts, increasing the 
likelihood of pollution incidents. Prior to IS taking over the Qayyara and Najma oil 
fields, an Angolan company, Sonangol, had acquired a 75% stake, along with North 
Oil Company (25%), at a price of $6,00 per barrel. This contract was awarded in 
December 2009 but Sonangol pulled out in 2014 for security reasons. Reserves were 
estimated at 800 million barrels for Qayyara and 900 million for Najma. 
To the north of Qayyara is the Al-Mishraq sulphur plant (35°58’50.76”N 
43°18’45.85”E), which was established in 1969, with production starting in 1971. 
It covers an area of approximately 15 km2 and contains the world’s largest sulphur 
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reserves estimated to be 544 MT. In 1990, the US-owned Freeport Company built 
a sulphur purification unit for $40 million that was damaged in the fighting in 2003. 
In 2013, under a $78,6 million award, the company Devco provided a complete 
purification facility with a capacity of 1 242 MT (1 370 tons) per day. The site 
includes a submerged combustion distillation system, sulphur recovery unit and 
sulphur filtration. The project was undertaken in coordination with CTI Consulting, 
River Consulting, ISTI Plant Services and Al Hawarth. Financing for the project came 
through JP Morgan Chase and Export–Import Bank of the United States. The Frasch 
process is used to exploit sulphur from underground deposits to depths of 120–200 m. 
The process depends upon water, electricity and chemicals. 
Military use of environmental degradation
Both Iraq and Syria experienced extreme environmental stress from a drought 
that lasted from 2007–2010.6,7 Water scarcity played a significant but complicated 
role in creating the conditions that led to the political unrest and violent insurrection 
in Syria in the spring of 2011,8 which spilled over into Iraq.9 The high air temperatures 
associated with the drought caused an increased demand for fuel and electricity for 
air conditioning. In Syria, the drought created food insecurity and migration, which 
could not be addressed effectively by the government. This further deepened ethnic 
and socio-political fractures that IS was able to exploit.10,11 IS actions demonstrated 
early that they understood the military significance of capturing and then operating, 
denying or destroying critical infrastructure such as electricity, fuel, food, water and 
transportation. This included the environmental resources that underpinned them. 
Once IS forces came under attack by anti-IS forces, they used tactics very similar to 
those used by Iraqi combat engineers in 2003 retreating from coalition forces. IS then 
attempted to delay the advancing force by damaging, denying or destroying natural 
resources and associated infrastructure. 
Water
In Syria and Iraq, records of water being used as a weapon date back 4500 
years.12,13 In 1991, when the Shia Marsh Arabs rebelled against Saddam Hussein, in 
support of the US invasion, he used water as a strategic weapon against them by 
diverting water to the marshes. These marshes had not fully recovered14,15 when 
IS considered the Marsh Arabs their enemies and used the Fallujah Dam to reduce 
flow to the marshes from the upper reaches of the Euphrates. In September 2014, IS 
inhibited the advance of Iraqi forces by using the Sudur mini-dam to flood villages in 
the Shirwain Basin area in Diyala Province.16 Then, in October 2014, IS diverted the 
Khalis River, a tributary of the Tigris River, to flood part of the town of Mansouriya in 
Diyala Province causing hundreds of families to flee.17 They also cut off the drinking 
water supply around Mansouriya, Slam and Sarajiq, which came from the Khalis 
River. Over the period August 2012 to July 2015, King (2016) identified 44 incidents 
of water manipulation in Iraq and Syria for political or military advantage.18 Of these, 
21 were attributable to IS showing its systematic use of water to achieve military, 
economic and political effect. Control of water has been significant in recruiting 
fighters locally and gaining legitimacy.19 
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Oil fi elds
The oil and gas sector has been used to achieve military eff ect by both state and 
non-state actors in the region. As the Iraqi Army retreated from Kuwait in February 
1991, they damaged or destroyed 749 oil wells, storage tanks and refi neries, 610 of 
which were set alight.20 Uncontrolled releases of oil began in January 1991, and fi res 
started in late February 1991. Iraqi forces also uncapped or damaged more than 130 
wells and allowed crude oil to fl ow freely across the landscape, causing large numbers 
of livestock and other animals to die. The oil that entered into the Persian Gulf polluted 
more than 706 km (439 miles) of the Saudi Arabian coastline.
Within IS, the Shura council identifi ed oil as fundamental to the survival of the 
insurgency, and critically, to fi nance their intent to create a caliphate.21 IS created a 
foothold in Syria’s oil-rich east that was used in conjunction with control of water to 
consolidate control over eastern Syria after the capture of Mosul in 2014 (Figure 1). 
Due to IS seizing control of oil fi elds, the Syrian government hydrocarbon production 
plunged from 383 000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2010 to 10 000 bpd in 2015 and 2016. 
When IS took over northern Iraq, it seized the Ajil and Allas fi elds in NE Kirkuk as 
well as Qayyara and Najma. Locals report that on the day of the takeover, IS secured 
the fi elds, and engineers were sent in to begin operations and start transporting oil to 
refi neries and markets. At the Qayyara refi nery, IS appointed an Egyptian engineer – 
who used to live in Sweden – as the new manager.22 
Fig 1. Control of oil fi eld and territory by IS in February 2016. 
Modifi ed from Solomon et al., 2016.
In September 2104, US military forces and partner nations, including Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, attacked 12 IS-controlled modular oil refi neries 
in eastern Syria in the vicinity of Al Mayadin, Al Hasakah and Abu Kamal.23 The 
127
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 46, Nr 1, 2018. doi: 10.5787/46-1-1228
determination that these were legitimate military targets was that these small-scale 
refineries provided fuel to run IS operations, money to finance their continued 
attacks throughout Iraq and Syria, and they were economic assets. IS was earning 
$1,5 million per day in 2015 from all the fields it was operating in Syria and Iraq.24 
These attacks were stated to be strategic in nature. Russian airstrikes in Syria were 
reported to have been more aggressive in destroying oil infrastructure compared to the 
coalition approach which, after November 2016, focused on disrupting the extraction 
process rather than hitting actual wells.25 In the summer of 2016, Iraqi media reported 
IS oil revenues were down by 90%.26
Sulphur
The Qayyara air base, 60 km south of Mosul, a hub for Mirage F1EQ, MiG-23 and 
25sMLs, was captured from Iraqi forces on 23 May 2003. It became Forward Operating 
Base (FOB) Endurance or Q-West for coalition forces. On 25 June, retreating Iraqi 
forces started a fire at the Al-Mishraq sulphur plant (45 km from Mosul) using rocket-
propelled grenades. Field samples of air in the vicinity of the fire detected SO2 at 
levels immediately dangerous to health and life, and hydrogen sulphide (H2S) was 
also released. The pollution in Mosul caused many people to be taken to hospitals 
and most vegetation was destroyed. Firefighters were primarily from FOB Endurance 
(Q-West) and included the 101st Airborne Division, 52nd Engineer Battalion, 326th 
Engineer Battalion, and the 887th Engineer Battalion. Many soldiers later reported 
a significant change in their ability to run two miles (3,2 km) on the Army Physical 
Fitness Test. A US Army Public Health Command study (2003) found 6 000 military 
personnel located within a 50 km radius of Mishraq during the 2003 fire but not all 
had been identified and tested.27 
Analysis of Qayyara oil and sulphur fires
Daily visible images from the moderate-resolution imaging spectroradiometer 
(MODIS), visible infrared imaging radiometer suite (VIIRS) and operational land 
imager (OLI) passing over Southern Nineveh were examined for hotspots and plumes. 
The MODIS instrument on the NASA Terra and Aqua satellites captured data in 36 
spectral bands ranging in wavelength from 0,4 µm to 14,4 µm. The VIIRS instrument 
on the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (Suomi NPP) can collect data in 
22 different spectral bands of the electromagnetic spectrum, in wavelengths between 
0,412 µm and 12,01 µm. The operational land imager (OLI) on Landsat 8 measures 
in the visible, near infrared, and short wave infrared portions of the spectrum. Fires 
east of Baiji were detected in MODIS and OLI images in early January 2016. Initially, 
around Mosul, one or two well fires were begun on 8 May 2016, lasting less than 
one day, and intermittently burned in June.28,29,30 Another fire complex began on 3 
July with daily fire detections occurring until about 12 July, when the fires greatly 
increased in number and continued to burn until gradual reductions occurred, starting 
in November 2016. On 20 October 2016, MODIS first detected a heat signature at 
Al-Mishraq and a large sulphur plume was observed. Figure 2 shows fire and thermal 
anomalies from Aqua and Terra MODIS instruments plus Suomi NPP VIRRS where 
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a plume from the sulphur plant appears grey-white due to sulphate aerosols and 
droplets of sulphuric acid, which refl ect light. Smoke plumes from the Qayyara oil 
fi eld are black due to black carbon and other aerosols that absorb light. White plumes 
observed in Kuwait oil fi res in 1991 were attributed to the majority of particles being 
salt (mostly NaCl) originating from oil-fi eld brines expelled from wells together with 
oil.31,32 At the Qayyara fi eld, no white plumes were observed in MODIS associated 
with oil well fi res.
In the Qayyara oil fi eld, hotspots and plumes were observed on 267 days over the 
period 13 June 2016 to 27 March 2017 (Table 1). This included days with heavy cloud 
cover where plumes could be seen only partially. Plumes from the Al-Mishraq sulphur 
plant were observed on fi ve days from 21 October 2016 to 26 October 2016. Plumes 
travelled most often to the south and southeast. Where there were multiple plumes on 
any given day, they could show variation in travel direction around a cardinal point, 
e.g. south or southwest. 
Figure 2. 4 MODIS observations with fi re and thermal anomalies from Aqua and 
Terra/MODIS plus Suomi NPP/VIRRS. Heat signatures of fi res are red spots. One 
at the Al-Mishraq Sulphur Plant was fi rst detected on October 20, 2016. a. October 
22nd and b. 23rd 2016 a plume of S02 (white) originated from a hotspot over Al-
Mishraq traveled SW and merged with plumes from oil fi res (black) from Qayyarah. 
c. On October 25th, 2016 S02 plume obscured by those from oil fi res from Qayyara 
blown N. d. On October 26th, 2016 a small plume of S02 plume blew E. Cloud cover 
exists in all observations but the plumes can be distinguished.
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Table 1. Number of days plumes from Qayyara and Al-Mishraq oil and sulphur fires 
were observed in MODIS images over the period of 13 June 2016 to 27 March 2017 
and the direction of travel. Numbers in parentheses are for sulphur plumes.
Month Days Cloud Plume N NE E SE S SW W NW
13 June 2016 to  
27 March 2017
267 91 225 18 17 (1) 37 (1) 60 (1) 54 40 (3) 28 26
Oil plumes appeared confined to the troposphere with relatively short residence 
time due to removal by cloud and precipitation. Initially, the plumes of SO2 and H2S 
from Al-Mishraq remained in the lower troposphere but lofted to higher altitudes. 
Data from the ozone monitoring instrument (OMI) shows the plume of SO2 and H2S 
was over Baghdad by 24 October with concentrations of ten dobson units.33 Using 
visible wavelength data, the number of days that plumes from the Qayyara oil field 
and Al-Mishraq sulphur plant travelled over surrounding urban centres was examined 
(Table 2). 
Table 2. Number of days plumes and hot spots from Qayyara and Al-Mishraq oil and 
sulphur fires were observed in MODIS images over surrounding urban centres for the 






















2016 to  
27 March 
2017
103 (3) 6 8 1 11 2 1 2
At lower altitudes, oil plumes reached Mosul on eight different days, Irbil on six 
different days and Kirkuk on 11 different days. The winds were most often southerly 
in direction. Qayyara city and the air base had 103 days when oil plumes were over 
them (Figure 3). Sulphur plumes travelled over Qayyara and the air base on three 
days. 
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Fig. 3. a. Operational Land Imager (OLI) on Landsat 8 false-color images acquired 
Jan 24, 2017. Shortwave-infrared, near-infrared, and green light (OLI bands 6-5-
3) show active fi res (bright red) from well fi res and plumes extending SW over 
Qayyara West Air Base. b. CNES/SPOT image showing from 1995 showing the air 
base and two weapons storage areas. WSA 2 measured 800 acres and contained 42 
munitions igloos. WSA 1 measured over 1640 acres and contained 30 munitions 
storage igloos. c. NIMA Tactical Pilotage Chart 1:50,000.
Market value of combusted oil
Of the 50 wells in the Qayyara fi eld, between 18 and 34 are reported to have been 
set on fi re by IS.34 Estimates from the Iraqi Oil Ministry were that 5 000 barrels of 
oil were burned per day. Using this fi gure, fi rst-order calculations were undertaken 
to determine the total number of barrels burned over the 267 days that plumes were 
observed and the range of market values (Table 3). Using a fi gure of 42 gallons per 
barrel (pb), 1,3 million barrels (56 million gallons or 212 million litres) were burned 
at the Qayyara oil fi eld. This represented a value of between $26,7 million and $45 
million at $20 pb and $45 pb respectively. This was a loss to IS oil revenues but also to 
the regional economy. In production yields, this represented a 62% loss at the Qayyara 
fi eld of pre-IS daily peak production of 8 000 bpd and a 45,7% loss of peak production 
over the year.
Table 3. Estimates of the amount of oil burned at the Qayyara oil fi eld by IS and its 












13 June 2016 to 
27 March 2017 267 1 335 000 56 070 000 212 265 000 26 700 000 60 075 000
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This loss of production yield and market value due to fires also resulted in a loss 
in revenue from road tankerage to refineries and the onward sale of products. It was 
assessed by security sources from the Iraqi ministry of oil that IS moved 50 tanker 
loads per day (tlpd) from Qayyara and Najma oil fields to refineries along the Iraq–
Syria border and then on to Syrian cities, e.g. Aleppo, 550 km west of Qayyara.35,36,37 
In a highly organised system, Syrian and Iraqi buyers went directly to the oil fields 
with their tankers to buy crude.38 This often resulted in tanker lines that became targets 
of airstrikes. IS responded by making tanker drivers register outside an oil field where 
they received the time to return to be filled. In this way, lines of tankers were reduced. 
Numbers of between 50 and 25 tlpd were used to estimate the number of tanker loads 
that were forgone (tlf) from Qayyara due to the 267 fire days and their value (Table 
4). The fires at Qayyara resulted in IS losing between $210 000 and $472 000 in 
revenue from road tankerage (50 tanker loads per day) to Syria using $20 pb and $45 
pb respectively. 
Table 4. Estimates of tanker loads per day (tlpd) from Qayyara that were forgone (tlf) 















due to 267 
fire days 
(barrels)
Total tlf due 
to 267 fire 
days (gallons)
Total tlf due 
to 267 fire 
days (litres)
$20 pb $45 pb
50 10 500 440 000 1 669 500 13 350 28 03 500 117 480 000 445 756 500 210 000 472 500
25 5 250 220 000 834 750 6 675 1 401 750 58 740 000 222 878 250 105 000 236 250
Market value of combusted sulphur
The fire at Al-Mishraq in October 2016 was started by IS reportedly putting 
explosives in sulphur piles, which covered an area of approximately 0,16 km2. Over 
six days of observation using MODIS and OMI data, 83 461 MT of SO2 were released 
into the atmosphere.39 This was smaller than the fire in June 2003, which released 
roughly 544 312 MT of SO2 over 30 days.
40 Using the figure for SO2 as a proxy for 
the tonnage of sulphur burned and the 2016 sulphur world price for September of 
$74 per MT, the market value of combusted sulphur was $6,1 million (Table 5). By 
comparison, the value of combusted sulphur from the 2003 fires, at September 2016 
prices, was $40,2 million.
Table 5. Estimates of the amount of SO2 released from sulphur fires at the Al-Mishraq 
sulphur plant (by IS in 2016 and Iraqi Forces in 2003) and the market value of sulphur.
Location Month Metric ton Sulphur price Sept 2016 $
Al-Mishraq October 2016 83 461 6 176 113,71
Al-Mishraq June 2003 544 310,8 40 279 002,46
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Air pollution from oil and sulphur fires
Using the calculations of the amount of oil burned at Qayyara (212 265 million 
litres) over 267 days (Table 3), emission estimates for selected pollutants (nitrogen 
dioxide [NO2], particulate matter 10 micrometres [PM10], particulate matter 2,5 
micrometres [PM2,5] and carbon monoxide [CO]) were calculated by multiplying the 
quantity of oil burned by a pollutant emission factor. Qayyara oil is heavy sour crude 
with a sulphur level > 5% and the full suite of pollutants released would have included 
SO2, NO2, CO, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAHs) and lead (Pb).
41 The factors 
used are for ‘open-burning’ of crude oil fires, and were obtained from a number of 
sources shown in Table 6 along with estimates derived from the 2005 Buncefield 
oil fires42. The latter fire burned an estimated 105 million litres of oil, petrol and 
kerosene.43 The emission estimates indicate that PM10 (31 172 MT using an emission 
factor of 170 000 mg/kg) and PM2,5 (18 703 MT using an emission factor of 102 mg/
kg) were the greatest relative proportion of the output of the Qayyara fires. This is 
similar to the analysis conducted after the Buncefield oil fires (Table 6). However, 
the dominant contributions of PM10 and PM2,5 are reversed with PM10 being higher at 
Qayyara and PM2,5 being higher at Buncefield. A total of 119 MT of NO2 (calculated 
using an emission factor of 651 mg/kg) and 5 501 MT of CO were emitted over the 267 
days. Proportionally, the emission estimates from Qayyara for NO2 and CO are similar 
to those for Buncefield. The reason for the high PM10 at Qayyara and observations of 
black plumes could be related to the efficiency of the combustion.44,45,46 Temperatures 
at well fires were reported to be 700 °C or 1292 °F.47












*Targa et al. (2006).
NO2 651 119 54,6
Derived from Lemieux et al. 
(2004) CO emission factor48 and 
ratio of NOX to CO reported by 
Evans et al. (1987).49
PM10 170 000 31 172 12 109,6
Lemieux et al. (2004)50 and US 
Dept of Defence range of PM10 
in total PM. 
PM2.5 102 18 703 72 65,7
From 60% PM3,5 figure of Ross 
et al. (1996).51
CO 30 000 5 501 2 514,1 Lemieux et al. (2004) for crude oil.52 
Carbon dioxide emissions per barrel of crude oil were determined by multiplying 
heat content by the carbon coefficient by the fraction oxidised times the ratio of the 
molecular weight of CO2 to that of carbon C (44/12):
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5,80 mmbtu per barrel × 20,31 kg C per mmbtu × 44 kg CO2/12 kg C × 
1 MT/1,000 kg  
= 0,43 MT CO2 per barrel.
0,43 MT CO2 per barrel x 1 335 000 barrels = 574 050 MT of CO2 emitted 
over the 267 days of the Qayyara fires. 
Estimating that a typical passenger vehicle emits 4,7 MT of CO2/yr,
53 the amount 
of CO2 released at Qayyara is equivalent to the emissions from 122 138 passenger 
cars in one year. Passenger vehicles are defined as two-axle four-tyre vehicles, namely 
passenger cars, vans, pickup trucks, and sport utility vehicles (SUVs).
The 83 461 MT of SO2 emissions from the fires at Al-Mishraq in 2016 (Table 5) 
were equivalent to a small volcanic eruption. In comparison with eruptions in 2016, 
this was one of the largest releases of SO2 that year.
54 
Fighting fires
After the Iraqi Army had retreated from Kuwait in 1991, it took 200 days and a 
massive response of some 10 000 engineers, firefighters, equipment operators and 
support personnel from around the world to extinguish the oil fires. The cost of fire 
fighting has been estimated at up to $2,5 billion, and $20 billion for repairs to the 
damaged oil wells and infrastructure, according to US government sources. Fighting 
the fires at the wells in the Qayyara oil field was left to the Northern Oil Company 
with military forces by-passing and moving north towards Mosul. Firefighting 
involved removing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), placed there by IS, from the 
wells, putting out the fires, controlling the gas release and preventing crude oil from 
moving into the water systems. Over 120 IEDs were found around the burning wells. 
On average, it took a team of 70 firefighters 30 days to extinguish one fire, working 
mostly without breathing equipment, or even face masks.55 In aggregate, this took 
1 020 fire days for 34 wells (30 days x 34 wells) and 70 firefighters per well, a total of 
71 400 person days. Excavators dumped load after load of damp sand onto the flames, 
while firefighters with high-pressure water hoses struggled to keep the machinery cool 
enough to function. At times, explosives were used to starve the fire of oxygen, and 
chemicals were also injected into the well pipe to smother flames. Once the source 
of the fire could be reached, a mixture of water and salt was injected into the pipe to 
stop the gas from coming up.56 Water usage was calculated for 300 gallons per minute 
(gpm) (1 135,62 litres) hoses using the reported average fire extinguishing times of 
30 days per fire (Table 7). One 300 gpm hose pumped 18 000 gallons (68 137 litres) 
in one hour, so 432 000 gallons (1,63 million litres) in 24 hours. Over 30 days, this 
amounted to 311 million gallons (1,17 billion litres). 
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Table 7. Estimates of water usage at one well from a 300 gpm fire hose over one hour, 












Litres in 2 
4 hours
Gallons in  
30 days
Litres in  
30 days
1 18 000 68 137 432 000 1 635 297 311 040 000 1 177 413 926
5 90 000 340 687 2 160 000 8 176 486 1 555 200 000 5 887 069 632
It is not known how many hoses were used per fire but images show a range of 
one to five. These observations have been used to estimate the total amount of water 
pumped over 30 days at each of the 34 wells (Table 8). One hose running continuously 
for 30 days pumped 10 billion gallons (40 billion litres). Five hoses pumped 52 
billion gallons (200 billion litres). The water from one hose pumping over 30 days 
is equivalent to filling 16 013 Olympic swimming pools (OSPs) equal to an area 
coverage of 20 km2. Over 30 days, the amount of water pumped by five hoses filled 
80 064 OSPs equal to an area coverage of 100 km2. 
Table 8. Estimates of water usage from a 300 gpm fire hose over 30 days at 34 well 
sites. These totals are then expressed as being equivalent to water held in an Olympic 




Gallons in 30 days 
for 34 wells
Litres in 30 days 
for 34 wells
Equivalence to 




1 10 575 360 000 40 032 073 498 16 013 20
5 52 876 800 000 200 160 367 488 80 064 100
Once an oil fire at a well head was extinguished, concrete was poured down the 
pipe to seal it. The total number of wells where this occurred is unknown but a total 
of 6 MT of concrete was used at well number 60 and the process took seven days. 
Using this figure, 204 MT of concrete and 238 worker days would have been required 
to seal 34 wells. 
Similar to the oil fires, the response to fires at the Al-Mishraq sulphur plant was 
left to civilian responders. Military forces by-passed this and continued to advance 
on Mosul. Similar to the oil fires, firefighting involved removing IEDs from around 
the plant, moving sulphur piles away from the reach of the fire using earth movers 
and trucks, putting out the fires with water, controlling the gas release and preventing 
secondary fires. Analysis of thermal anomalies in MODIS data shows the fires were 
controlled within six days. Again, firefighters worked mostly without breathing 
equipment or even face masks. The numbers of firefighters and machines and the 
quantity of water used are unknown but media images show large numbers. Using 
figures in Table 7, the estimate of water usage from one to five 300 gpm fire hoses 
used over six days was 62,2 million gallons (235,48 million litres) and 311 million 
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gallons (1,17 billion litres) respectively (Table 9). The water from one hose pumping 
for six days is equivalent to filling 94 OSPs equal to an area coverage of 0,12 km2. 
Over the same period, the amount of water pumped by five hoses could fill 471 OSPs 
equal to an area coverage of 0,59 km2.
Table 9. Estimates of water usage from a 300 gpm fire hose over six days at Al-
Mishraq sulphur plant. These totals are then expressed as equivalent to water held in 




Gallons in  
6 days Litres in 6 days
Equivalence to 
water in an OSP
Equivalent OSP  
area km2
1 62 208 000 235 482 785 94 0,12
5 311 040 000 1 177 413 926 471 0,59
Water contamination
The water used to fight the fires would have been contaminated with firefighting 
products, fuels and fuel-related products. Estimates of the combined water usage 
to fight the oil fires (30 days each at 34 wells) at Qayyara and the sulphur fires 
(six days) at Al-Mishraq are shown in Table 10 to be 10,64 billion gallons (40,27 
billion litres) from one hose and 53,19 billion gallons (201,34 billion litres) from 
five hoses. The water from one hose would have been equivalent to filling 16 107 
OSPs and 80 535 OSPs from five hoses. This is equal to an area coverage of 20,13 
km2 and 100,67 km2. This water was not captured or contained and so would have 
contaminated groundwater and entered into the Tigris River. This will need to be 
monitored in boreholes and by digging trial pits to monitor contamination of the land 
in the Qayyara and Al-Mishraq areas.
Table 10. Estimates of combined water usage from using 300 gpm fire hoses over 30 
days at Qayyara and six days at the Al-Mishraq sulphur plant. These totals are then 
expressed as equivalent to water held in an Olympic swimming pool (2 500 m3) and 





Gallons of water 
used for oil and 
sulphur fires over 
36 days
Litres for water 
used for oil and 
sulphur fires over 
36 days
Water used for 
oil and sulphur 
expressed as OSP
Water used for 
oil and sulphur 
expressed as 
OSP area km2
1 10 637 568 000 40 267 556 283 16 107 20,13
5 53 187 840 000 201 337 781 414 80 535 100,67
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Damage to oil infrastructure
In response to the degradation and destruction of oil and gas infrastructure in 
Syria and along the Syria–Iraq border by US military forces, partner nations and the 
Russians, IS constructed open ditches or pits for storing crude. They then used portable 
metal furnaces to distil raw petroleum from these pits into fuel (Figure 4). Over 1 600 
furnaces were identifi ed in northern Iraq, with 600 between Qayyara and Hawija.57 
When heated in a furnace, crude oil produces various oil products depending on the 
temperature. The hydrocarbons evaporate and fl ow through a pipeline at the top of the 
furnace. The vapour in the pipe is cooled while fl owing through a pipeline into a water 
basin. The vapour condenses, and the liquid is collected at the end of the pipe. These 
makeshift refi neries work at a fraction of the output of pre-confl ict refi neries but IS 
took advantage of fuel shortages to raise prices. 
Many of these distilleries were worked by children. The portable metal furnaces 
were susceptible to accidents and spills, particularly where they had been damaged. 
This caused signifi cant local environmental damage. Uncontrolled burning of crude 
oil released dangerous levels of pollutants. Many of the children who worked the 
distilleries incurred skin and respiratory diseases and severe burn injuries that will 
impede future livelihoods.58 Communities living in proximity to the sites were likely 
aff ected, and the eff ect on health and the environment should be investigated. 
Fig 4. a. Aerial photo of multiple makeshift refi neries around Mosul. b. A boys 
controlling the temperature of a portable metal furnace. c. View from the furnace 
through the water basin back to the collection point. From Oilprice.com.
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Hazards on the ground related to oil 
Under IS control and the subsequent fighting, oil fields have been targeted and 
have not had proper maintenance while under their control. This resulted in increased 
numbers of spills and leaks due to infrastructure damage and destruction, a lack of 
technology for leak detection and prevention, environmentally unacceptable disposal 
of drill cuttings and tank bottom sludge, flaring off gas, little or no protection of 
aquifers and disposal of oil-contaminated water to shallow aquifers, to the Tigris or 
to land. On 28 August 2017, as Iraqi forces entered Qayyara, IS reportedly opened up 
oil pipes in the town and flooded the streets with crude. UNICEF arrived the next day 
and found oil spilling into the Tigris River, the town’s main source of drinking water. 
This is on top of the significant degradation of soil and groundwater, and air pollution 
that occurred in the 1990s and during the Second Gulf War.59 
Oil products are a mixture of many different chemicals, making predicting their 
environmental fate and effects difficult.60 Spills of heavy crude at the Qayyara oil 
field will partially degrade, a fraction will volatilise, while the remainder will adhere 
to soil and sediments. Little evaporation or dissolution will occur and it will weather 
very slowly. Generally, short-chained aromatic compounds such as benzene, toluene, 
ethylene and xylene (BTEX) are highly mobile and volatilise easily. Longer-chained 
compounds (large alkanes) have very low solubility, often remaining attached to local 
soil and sediments.61 Large-scale releases of PAHs could potentially have severe 
long-term environmental impact. PAHs are very persistent organic compounds, some 
of which are potential carcinogens and/or could cause respiratory problems. When 
released by fires, they can be transported over a large area before deposition in soils.62
The short-chained and aromatic compounds pose a greater threat as they move 
into soil and air, exposing people via inhalation. The threat is related to the quantity 
released, the composition of the oil and the age of the released oil products. Long-
term exposure to some of the oil-related substances (BTEX and PAHs) is associated 
with various health problems, such as respiratory disorders, liver problems, kidney 
disorders and cancer, depending on the duration and intensity of exposure.63 Due to 
their prolonged exposure with minimal protection, the firefighters from Iraq’s North 
Oil Company are at high risk as are civilians living in Qayyara. Aid workers and 
military personnel would have spent less time in these hazardous environments but 
the impact on them individually would be dependent upon their level of toxicity and 
length of exposure. 
Oil pollution can be especially problematic for local ecological receptors, 
as certain animals, such as birds, are very sensitive to exposure to petroleum 
compounds.64 Nitrogen (N) and sulphur (S) compounds are associated with acid 
rain, which negatively affects vegetation and causes acidification of soils. The soils 
around Qayyara have already been degraded by previous conflict, desertification and 
unsustainable agricultural practices. Groundwater pollution must be anticipated to 
have occurred where oil was released onto the soil surface65 and additionally from 
contaminated water from firefighting. This will affect agricultural land and those 
using ground and surface water for irrigation, drinking and domestic purposes. This 
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poses a long-term vulnerability to health, livelihoods and societal stability as it does 
in Syria66 and must be understood if it is to be addressed.
Medical eff ects of oil and sulphur fi res
Some health eff ects associated with air pollution are well recognised, such as 
increases in hospital admissions and deaths from cardiovascular diseases, respiratory 
diseases and lung cancer.67 People with pre-existing cardiovascular and respiratory 
diseases and older people are particularly at risk. However, researchers around the 
world are fi nding that air pollution may be associated with a much wider range of 
health conditions. The Royal College of Physicians has collated evidence on the 
eff ects of air pollution on diabetes and neurological diseases, as well as the way 
exposure during pregnancy may be associated with low birth weight and pre-term 
births.68
Even without the eff ects of fi res, ambient temperatures in and around Qayyara 
and Al-Mishraq during the summer 2016 and 2017 were 49 °C (120 °F). Due to the 
drought, IS control and confl ict, people were malnourished and physically as well 
as mentally stressed. Civilians displaced by fi ghting were severely aff ected by the 
fi res, plumes and fallout.69,70 Thick smoke blocked out the sun, reducing temperatures 
locally. Fallout of oil, soot, sulphur and acid rain aff ected areas under the path of 
plumes (Figure 5). 
Fig 5. View of the Qayyara oil fi eld with a fi re in the near ground having been 
extinguished using pipes, earth moving and shelter boxes in the near and mid 
ground. Another fi re still burns in the distance with the plume rising near vertically 
to join a layer of soot particles spread over the whole horizon. Note the oil and soot 
on the desert fl oor. Photo from Kate Geraghty.
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Those in the path of plumes and fallout were constantly exposed to numerous 
substances from multiple sources. Most risk assessment approaches and procedures 
evaluate risks on a substance-by-substance basis and not the combined health effects 
of exposure to multiple chemicals.71 Analysis of the wind direction and plume 
incidence (Table 2) shows that civilians around Qayyara as well as military and 
humanitarian personnel experienced high exposure to oil and sulphur fire toxins.72 
Qayyara’s roughly 20 000 residents remained after IS had started the fires and were 
exposed for over 267 days. For 103 days, people south of oil wells in the Qayyara field 
were enveloped in the combined plumes from all the fires. Medical facilities reported 
immediate severe short-term health effects, especially to people with pre-existing 
respiratory problems.73 Doctors in a hospital in Qayyara district reported patients who 
claimed that they had never smoked in their lives come in with their lungs coated in 
tar. A 1,9-km (1,2-mile) stretch of hastily erected plastic tarp tents that made up the 
Qayyarah Airstrip Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) camp housed approximately 
50 000 IDPs. Doctors reported on 21 April 2017 that almost everyone was coughing, 
sick or complaining about smoke. Dr Tayseer Alkarim, an oncologist from the France-
based group called Women and Health Alliance International (WAHA), reported, 
“people usually came to our health center seeking treatment for symptoms like fever, 
coughing, respiratory problems, diarrhea and asthma complications”.74 
Inhaled SO2 readily reacts with the moisture of mucous membranes to form 
sulphurous acid (H2SO3), which is a severe irritant. People with asthma can experience 
increased airway resistance with SO2 concentrations of less than 0,1 parts per million 
(ppm) when exercising. Healthy adults experience increased airway resistance at 5 
ppm, sneezing and coughing at 10 ppm, and bronchospasm at 20 ppm.75 SO2 is heavier 
than air; thus, exposure in poorly ventilated, enclosed or low-lying areas could result 
in asphyxiation. Respiratory protection is required for exposures at or above 20 ppm. 
Exposures of 50 to 100 ppm may be tolerated for more than 30 to 60 minutes, but 
higher or longer exposures could cause death from airway obstruction. Iraqi army 
officials reported that the sulphur cloud from Al-Mishraq spread over 5 km2, forcing 
the evacuation of about 200 families. Two people were reported dead and up to 
1 000 people were treated for breathing problems. The United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) reported that the Directorate of Health and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) treated over 1 000 persons for suffocation symptoms in the cities 
of Qayyara, Makhmour and Ijhala.76 The effects on military personnel are unknown 
but the Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) provided 
more than 24 000 protective chemical masks to Iraqi and Peshmerga forces during 
training in preparation for the Mosul offensive. As learned in Kuwait77 and at Al-
Mishraq in 2003,78 if military forces do not use their personal protective equipment 
(PPE), or use it improperly, the severity of effect would be dependent upon the level 
of toxicity and length of exposure.
When SO2 meets water, it instantly dissolves to form sulphuric acid (H2SO4) and 
when this gets into soil by merging with water, it could persist for years, leaching out 
minerals, compromising agriculture, and harming nearby aquatic life through runoff. 
The effects on soils, aquifers and drinking water will need to be monitored.
140
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 46, Nr 1, 2018. doi: 10.5787/46-1-1228
IS tactics of setting fi res
The military concept for IS setting fi res appears originally intended to deter 
coalition airstrikes, but later became a ground tactic to thwart the advance of US-
backed Iraqi government and Peshmerga forces. The military eff ect IS achieved on 
the ground by setting the fi res at Qayyara and Al-Mishraq was localised and variable. 
It was a tactic for attempting some air defence when IS had no air assets other than 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Fires achieved low-level atmospheric obscuration 
deterring airstrikes and artillery fi re, which required visible alignment, aiming and 
battle damage assessments. This was overcome by either aircraft or by anti-IS ground 
forces moving out of the path of the plumes or with sensors using other parts of 
the electromagnetic spectrum. Fire and oil spills caused some route denial to the 
advancing anti-IS forces but, as in the previous Gulf wars, this was quickly overcome 
with mechanised forces by-passing and continuing the advance on Mosul. Some 
success was had by IS trading space and resources for time but advancing anti-IS 
forces did not expend their resources to deal with the fi res. The fi res at Al-Mishraq 
caused delay to advancing forces by forcing them to wear PPE or move out of the 
impact area. In addition to the challenges of wearing PPE in the desert, it produced 
tensions within the anti-IS force due to very diff erent scalings of equipment within 
diff erent fi ghting units. This ranged from full chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (CBRN) capability in main battle tanks through to no PPE (Figure 6). This in 
turn caused some reconfi guration of the order of battle within anti-IS forces, but the 
advance continued. 
Fig 6. a. A U.S. Army M109A6 Paladin howitzer conducts a fi re mission at Qayyara 
West Airfi eld, Iraq, in support of the Iraqi forces’ push toward Mosul, Oct. 17, 2016. 
Army photo by Spc. Christopher Brecht. b. Iraqi forces wear a range of protective 
equipment  after winds brought fumes from a nearby sulfur plant set alight by 
Islamic State militants, at south of Mosul in Qayyara, Iraq, October 22, 2016. 
REUTERS/Alaa Al-Marjani.
The fi res aff ected the use of the Qayyara air base by anti-IS forces after it had been 
recaptured from IS on 9 July 2016. The base became the headquarters for the Battle 
of Mosul, and work immediately began on repairs to the runway, which was reopened 
on 22 October 2016. From 13 June 2016 to 27 March 2017, the 103 days with oil 
plumes and three days with sulphur plumes aff ected the air quality but did not stop air 
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or artillery strikes being launched. It did however affect the health of anti-IS forces 
deployed there, necessitating protective measures. 
Civilians in the areas of the fires and plumes had no protection from exposure, 
with the resulting medical and environmental consequences. Causing fires was 
therefore effective as a terror weapon but was unlikely to have gained IS support for 
their cause in the longer term. 
By taking over and operating oil fields and the Al-Mishraq sulphur plant, IS 
achieved financial strength. They held a monopoly of an essential commodity in a 
captive market in Syria and Iraq. This strength and the accompanying revenue were 
lost when IS set these fires. This raises questions as to whether this was a tactical 
decision within IS, supported at strategic level. The evidence does not support IS 
having been ready to put out the oil fires they themselves had set so they could resume 
raising revenue from oil and sulphur if the advancing anti-IS forces had been stopped. 
There is also no evidence that IS had the medical capability to deal with the negative 
health consequences for which they were responsible either in the short or long term. 
The production and refining of oil and the sulphur purification process have key 
dependencies and interdependencies, especially around water, chemicals, power, 
transport and communication. As an example, flooding down the Tigris due to failure 
of the Mosul Dam would likely destroy the pump facility critical to the Al-Mishraq 
sulphur plant. Without water from the Tigris, the plant would have to cease operations. 
It appears that IS had capability to assess dependencies and interdependencies 
as part of their planning. They used this knowledge to understand criticality and 
vulnerability. This in turn was used to seize, operate, control or destroy physical 
infrastructure in territory they captured. Once they were losing ground to anti-IS 
forces, this same understanding was used to damage, destroy or booby-trap this 
infrastructure systematically as they retreated. The willingness to use environmental 
degradation appears to have scaled from destroying individual pumps and wells to 
breaching dams. However, the evidence does not support IS having the ability to 
repair or replace these should the advancing anti-IS forces be stopped. This again 
raises the question whether this was a tactical decision supported at strategic level 
by the IS Shura council. Implied by these actions is a fundamental weakness in 
the strategic management and sustainability of the environment by the caliphate. 
Without provision of environmental infrastructure and health care, the legitimacy of 
IS in the eyes of the population under its control would diminish. Water, food and 
health insecurity compounded by climate change and further drought also could not 
have been addressed effectively, further weakening loyalty to IS. It is important to 
understand whether this was due to losses caused by anti-IS forces or whether this 
was the result of political, economic and military actors within IS being unable to co-
operate to sustain the caliphate over the long term.
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Conclusion
Although essentially forbidden by the Geneva Conventions,79 attacks on 
industrial infrastructure,80 including oil facilities, have been commonplace in armed 
conflict81,82 and IS have systematically carried them out. Fires amplified the existing 
humanitarian crises in an environment degraded with a toxic legacy from previous 
conflicts, coupled with desertification and unsustainable agricultural practices. Like 
protection from torture and religious persecution, a healthy environment is a human 
right that is getting greater scrutiny in conflict-affected countries.83 The wider issue 
of the environmental footprint of conflict and the way it affects populations is gaining 
a strong legal framework to address liabilities and provide timely support to those 
affected.84 King (2017) notes that the best possible international diplomatic response 
to the growing capacity of hostile non-state actors to use water as a weapon, is to 
legitimise state power.85 This can be extended to using environmental degradation 
as a weapon86 and can be achieved by nations supporting international agreements 
and facilitating co-operation among the governments of Turkey, Iraq and possibly 
Syria as well as the Kurdistan Region.87 Nations could use diplomatic leverage in the 
United Nations and other bodies to support the application and enforcement of an 
existing body of international law that prohibits using environmental destruction and 
degradation as a weapon. 
Critical is the documentation of environmental destruction and attribution. 
However, in the case of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, it has become increasingly 
apparent that fewer humanitarian organisations are working in these conflict zones 
than before, as they too have become targets of violence. Examination here has shown 
that remotely identifying environmental degradation caused by IS at Qayyara and 
Al-Mishraq is possible and it can be quantified. This enables attribution of IS actions 
assisting in prosecution of IS and messaging against ideology. Such examinations 
could also help identify environmental hazards and protect civilians from exposure 
over either the short or the long term to the worst health effects. Vital to effective 
recovery and reconstruction is communicating risk to civilians to prevent exposure 
to hazardous materials. This contributes further considerations for post-conflict 
environmental remediation and protection of natural resources getting increased 
support and scrutiny globally.
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